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Supersinglets |S
(d)
N
〉 are states of total spin zero of N particles of d levels. Some applications of the
|S
(N)
N
〉 and |S
(2)
N
〉 states are described. The |S
(N)
N
〉 states can be used to solve three problems which
have no classical solution: The “N strangers,” “secret sharing,” and “liar detection” problems. The
|S
(2)
N
〉 (with N even) states can be used to encode qubits in decoherence-free subspaces.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.65.Ta
I. SUPERSINGLETS
Quantum information has changed not only the way
we understand quantum mechanics; it has also changed
the way we use quantum mechanics in our dealings with
the real world. For years, the research on quantum me-
chanics has focused on pointing out how different quan-
tum mechanics was from classical physics. The next step
has been to realize that quantum mechanics can be used
to solve problems unsolvable by any other means. How-
ever, although quantum states are powerful tools, they
are very fragile for most real-life applications. There-
fore, the challenge is twofold: on one hand, to find out
new applications—problems without classical solutions
that can be solved with the aid of quantum states; on
the other, to find out how to protect quantum states—
methods that allow us to use quantum states for practical
purposes. In this paper I review some results regarding
a particular family of quantum states. The properties of
these states, particularly their symmetry, grant them a
prominent role in this challenge.
Supersinglets |S(d)N 〉 are states of total spin zero of N
particles, all of them of spin (d− 1)/2. Supersinglets are
N -lateral rotationally invariant. This means that, if we
act on any of them with the tensor product of N equal
rotation operators, the result will be to reproduce the
same state (within a possible phase factor):
R
⊗
N
∣∣∣S(d)N
〉
=
∣∣∣S(d)N
〉
, (1)
R
⊗
N being R⊗ . . .⊗R, where R is a rotation operator.
In this paper, |01 . . . 2〉 denotes the tensor product
state |0〉⊗ |1〉⊗ . . . |2〉, where |i〉 corresponds to the state
with eigenvalue (d − 1)/2 − i of the spin along the z-
direction. The basis we shall use, Bd = {|i〉}d−1i=0 , and the
basis of eigenvectors of the spin along the z-direction,
Bs = {|m〉}sm=−s, have the same kets, except that they
are in reverse order: the ket |i〉 of Bd is equal to the ket
|s− i〉 of Bs.
The interest in some types of supersinglets is not new.
For instance, the two-particle d-level supersinglets |S(d)2 〉
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attracted some attention in connection with violations
of Bell’s inequalities for systems of two spin-s particles
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. These states can be expressed
as
∣∣∣S(d)2
〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
i=0
(−1)i|i〉 ⊗ |d− i− 1〉. (2)
Examples of |S(d)2 〉 states are the following:∣∣∣S(2)2
〉
=
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) , (3)
∣∣∣S(3)2
〉
=
1√
3
(|02〉 − |11〉+ |20〉) , (4)
∣∣∣S(4)2
〉
=
1
2
(|03〉 − |12〉+ |21〉 − |30〉) . (5)
The |S(3)2 〉 state has also been used in two-particle proofs
of Bell’s theorem without inequalities [11, 12, 13]. A
method for preparing optical analogs of |S(d)2 〉 for every
d has been recently described [14]. Also, an experimental
violation of a Bell’s inequality using an optical analog of
|S(3)2 〉 has been recently reported [15].
In this paper we are interested in two types of supers-
inglets: N -particle N -level supersinglets, |S(N)N 〉, and N -
qubit (with N even) supersinglets, |S(2)N 〉. The former
can be expressed as
∣∣∣S(N)N
〉
=
1√
N !
∑
permutations
of 01...(N−1)
(−1)t |ij . . . n〉 , (6)
where t is the number of transpositions of pairs of ele-
ments that must be composed to place the elements in
canonical order (i.e., 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1). The |S(2)2 〉 state
is given in equation (3). Other examples of |S(N)N 〉 states
are the following:
∣∣∣S(3)3
〉
=
1√
6
(|012〉 − |021〉 − |102〉+ |120〉
+ |201〉 − |210〉), (7)∣∣∣S(4)4
〉
=
1√
24
(|0123〉 − |0132〉 − |0213〉+ |0231〉
+ |0312〉 − |0321〉 − |1023〉+ |1032〉
2+ |1203〉 − |1230〉 − |1302〉+ |1320〉
+ |2013〉 − |2031〉 − |2103〉+ |2130〉
+ |2301〉 − |2310〉 − |3012〉+ |3021〉
+ |3102〉 − |3120〉 − |3201〉+ |3210〉). (8)
The |S(3)3 〉 state has been used in the solution of the
so-called Byzantine agreement problem [16] (see more on
this problem in section III). The |S(N)N 〉 states have been
used in a scheme designed to probe a quantum gate that
realizes an unknown unitary transformation [17]. Some
interesting properties of |S(3)3 〉 have been reported in [18].
An experimental realization of |S(3)3 〉 has been recently
proposed [19].
For N even, the N -qubit supersinglet can be expressed
as
∣∣∣S(2)N
〉
=
1
N
2 !
√
N
2 + 1
∑
permutations
of 0...01...1
z!
(
N
2
− z
)
!(−1)N2 −z
|ij . . . n〉 , (9)
where the sum is extended to all the states obtained by
permuting the state |0 . . . 01 . . . 1〉, which contains the
same number of zeros and ones; z is the number of zeros
in the first N/2 positions (for example: in |01〉, z = 1;
in |1100〉, z = 0; in |010110〉, z = 2). The |S(2)2 〉 state is
given in equation (3). Other examples of |S(2)N 〉 (with N
even) states are the following:
∣∣∣S(2)4
〉
=
1
2
√
3
(2|0011〉 − |0101〉 − |0110〉
−|1001〉 − |1010〉+ 2|1100〉), (10)∣∣∣S(2)6
〉
=
1
6
(3|000111〉 − |001011〉 − |001101〉
−|001110〉 − |010011〉 − |010101〉
−|010110〉+ |011001〉+ |011010〉
+|011100〉 − |100011〉 − |100101〉
−|100110〉+ |101001〉+ |101010〉
+|101100〉+ |110001〉+ |110010〉
+|110100〉 − 3|111000〉). (11)
Very recently, the |S(2)4 〉 state has been experimentally
prepared using four parametric down-converted photons
entangled in polarization [20]. Some applications of the
|S(2)N 〉 states are described in section V.
The structure of this paper is the following: In sec-
tion II, three apparently unrelated problems are intro-
duced. In section III, these three problems are proved
to not have classical solution. In section IV a solution
based on the use of the |S(N)N 〉 states is presented. Fi-
nally, in section V, the use of the |S(2)N 〉 states to create
decoherence-free subspaces with qubits is described.
II. THREE PROBLEMS
A. The N strangers problem
The scenario for the N strangers problem (NSP) is an
extension to a high number N of players of the situation
described in Patricia Highsmith’s novel [21] and Alfred
Hitchcock’s movie [22] Strangers on a Train: N complete
strangers Ai (i = 1, . . . , N) meet on a train. Ai wants Bi
dead. In the course of small talk, one suggests that an
“exchange” murder between N complete strangers would
be unsolvable. After all, how could the police find the
murderer when he/she is a total and complete stranger
with absolutely no connection whatsoever to the victim?
Ai could kill Bk, etc. However, such a plan suffers from
an important problem: if all the players know who the
murderer of each victim is, then the whole plan is vul-
nerable to individual denunciations. Alternatively, if the
distribution of victims is the result of a secret lottery,
how could the murderers be assured that the lottery was
not rigged and that nobody had contrived the result or
could ascertain it?
In more general, noncriminal, terms the N strangers
problem can be reformulated as follows: Each of N par-
ties must perform one among N different tasks which
they do not want to perform themselves. However, each
party volunteers to perform some other party’s task.
The problem is then how to distribute the vic-
tims/tasks {Bi}N1 among the murderers/volunteers
{Ai}N1 , which share no previous secret information nor
any secure classical channel, in a way that guarantees
that each murderer/volunteer Ai knows only the iden-
tity of his/her victim/task and that nobody else (besides
the murderers/volunteers) knows anything about the vic-
tim/task assignments.
B. The secret sharing problem
The secret sharing problem (SSP) was already de-
scribed, for N = 3, in [23]. It could arise in the following
context: A1 wants to have a secret action taken on her
behalf at a distant location. There she has N − 1 agents,
A2, A3, . . . , AN who carry it out for her. A1 knows that
some of them are dishonest, but she does not know which
ones. She cannot simply send a secure message to all of
them, because the dishonest ones will try to sabotage the
action, but it is assumed (as in [23]) that if all of them
carry it out together, the honest ones will keep the dis-
honest ones from doing any damage. The problem is then
that A1 wishes to convey a cryptographic key to A2, A3,
. . . , AN in such a way that none of them can read it on
their own, only if all the Ai (i = 2, 3, . . . , N) collaborate.
In addition, they wish to prevent any eavesdropper from
acquiring information without being detected. It is as-
sumed that A1 shares no previous secret information nor
any secure classical channel with her agents. Different
quantum solutions to this problem for N = 3 has been
3proposed using either GHZ [23, 24] or Bell states [25] (see
also [26]). Below we shall propose a different solution for
any N .
C. The liar detection problem
The liar detection problem (LDP) occurs in the follow-
ing scenario: three parties A, B, and C are connected by
secure pairwise classical channels. Let us suppose that A
sends a message m to B and C, and B sends the same
message to C. If both A and B are honest, then C should
receive the same m from A and B. However, A could
be dishonest and send different messages to B and C,
mAB 6= mAC , or, alternatively, B could be dishonest and
send a message which is different from the one he re-
ceives, mBC 6= mAB. For C the problem is to ascertain
without any doubt who is being dishonest. This prob-
lem is interesting for classical information distribution in
pairwise connected networks. The message could be a
database and the dishonest behavior a consequence of an
error during the copying or distribution process.
III. PROOFS OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF
CLASSICAL SOLUTIONS
In this section I shall explain in which sense each of the
three problems introduced in section II have no classical
solution. I will furthermore offer proofs of the impossi-
bility of the existence of that kind of solutions.
In Peres’ book [27] (p. 293), the key distribution prob-
lem (KDP) is defined as follows: “The problem (. . . ) is
how to distribute a cryptographic key (a secret sequence
of bits) to several observers who initially share no secret
information, by using an insecure communication chan-
nel subject to inspection by a hostile eavesdropper. If
only classical means are used, this is an impossible task.
Quantum phenomena, on the other hand, provide various
solutions. The reason for this difference is that informa-
tion stored in classical form (. . . ) can be examined objec-
tively without altering it in any detectable way, let alone
destroying it, while it is impossible to do that with quan-
tized information encoded in unknown non-orthogonal
states.”
In this definition, trusted couriers, clandestine meet-
ings or private secure communication links between the
parties are not allowed. It is in this scenario—namely,
one in which previous secret information and secure com-
munication channels between all parties (in the NSP)
or between A1 and her agents (in the SSP) are not al-
lowed, but public classical channels which cannot be al-
tered are assumed—in which the first two problems (NSP
and SSP) have no classical solution. A proof follows.
Lemma 1 The KDP between two parties has no classical
solution.
Proof: Information stored in classical form can be ex-
amined objectively without altering it in any detectable
way, q.e.d.
Lemma 2 The NSP has no classical solution.
Proof: Suppose the NSP had a classical solution for
some N > 1. Then, N − 2 parties could publicly an-
nounce the names of their victims and then the remain-
ing two parties would have a way to solve the KDP (for
instance, by publicly assigning 0 and 1 to the remaining
two victims and agreeing to define the corresponding en-
try of the key as the bit value assigned to the victim of
one of the two parties), q.e.d.
Lemma 3 The SSP has no classical solution.
Proof: Suppose the SSP had a classical solution for
some N > 2 (if N = 1, then the SSP is the KDP).
Such a solution must work even when all of A1’s agents
are honest. In this case, N − 2 agents could publicly
collaborate and share the result of such a collaboration
with the remaining agent. Then A1 and the remaining
agent would have a way to solve the KDP, q.e.d.
The scenario of the third problem, the LDP, is differ-
ent. A, B, and C are now connected by pairwise clas-
sical channels. These channels must be secure. In this
scenario—namely, one in which previous secret informa-
tion is not allowed, but secure pairwise classical channels
are assumed—, the LDP has no classical solution. In
order to prove this, we need some previous results.
The Byzantine generals problem (BGP) is defined [28,
29] as follows: A commanding general must send an order
to his N−1 lieutenant generals such that: (IC1) All loyal
lieutenant generals obey the same order. (IC2) If the
commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant
general obeys the order he sends. (IC1) and (IC2) are
known as the interactive consistency conditions. Note
that if the commanding general is loyal, (IC1) follows
from (IC2). However, the commanding general may be a
traitor.
Lemma 4 The BGP for N = 3 generals and 1 traitor
has no classical solution.
Proof [29] (p. 384): For simplicity, we consider the
case in which the only possible orders are “attack” or
“retreat”. Let us first examine the scenario in which
the commanding general is loyal and sends an “attack”
order, but lieutenant general 2 is a traitor and reports to
lieutenant general 1 that he received a “retreat” order.
For (IC2) to be satisfied, lieutenant general 1 must obey
the order to attack. Now consider another scenario in
which the commanding general is a traitor and sends an
“attack” order to lieutenant general 1 and a “retreat”
order to lieutenant general 2. Lieutenant general 1
does not know who the traitor is, and he cannot tell
what message the commanding general actually sent to
4lieutenant general 2. Hence, the scenarios in these two
cases appear exactly the same to lieutenant general 1.
If the traitor lies consistently, then there is no way for
lieutenant general 1 to distinguish between these two
situations, so he must obey the “attack” order in both of
them. Hence, whenever lieutenant general 1 receives an
“attack” order from the commanding general, he must
obey it, q.e.d.
For a more rigorous proof, see [28].
Lemma 5 No solution for the BGP for N < 3M + 1
generals can cope with M traitors.
Proof: The BGP for N < 3M + 1 generals and M
traitors can be reduced to the BGP for N = 3 generals
and M = 1 traitor, with each of the generals simulating
at most M lieutenants and taking the same decision as
the loyal lieutenants they simulate, q.e.d.
A solution for the BGP for N > 3M and up to M
traitors is given in [29].
The protocol proposed in [16] solves the BGP for N =
3 in the following sense: (1) If all generals are loyal, then
the protocol achieves broadcast. (2) If one general is a
traitor, then either the protocol achieves broadcast or
both loyal generals abort the protocol.
The LDP described in section II is simplification of the
BGP for N = 3 and M = 1.
Lemma 6 The LDP has no classical solution.
Proof: Supposing that the LDP had a classical solu-
tion, then the BGP for N = 3 and M = 1 had classical
solution, q.e.d.
IV. SOLUTIONS
In this section I will show that all three problems in-
troduced in section II can be solved if each of the N
participants are in possession of a sequence of numbers
with the following properties:
(i) It is random (i.e., generated by an intrinsically un-
repeatable method which gives each possible num-
ber with the same probability of occurring).
(ii) The possible numbers are integers from 0 to N − 1.
(iii) If a number i is at position j of the sequence of
party k, i is not at position j in the sequence of a
different party.
(iv) Each party knows only his/her own sequence.
(v) Nobody else (besides the parties) knows the se-
quences.
Properties (iv) and (v) are difficult to accomplish using
classical tools due to the fact that information transmit-
ted in classical form can be examined and copied without
altering it in any detectable way. However, as quantum
key distribution protocols show [30, 31], quantum infor-
mation does not suffer from such a drawback. Assum-
ing we have a reliable method of generating sequences
of numbers with properties (i) to (v) among N distant
parties, a method that will be presented below, then the
solutions to the above problems are described in the fol-
lowing subsections.
A. Solution to the N strangers problem
Each victim Bi is assigned a label, taken from 0 to
N − 1. If murderer Ai’s sequence starts with j, then Ai
must kill Bj , etc. The remaining entries of the sequence
can be used for subsequent rounds. The result tells ev-
ery murderer who his/her victim is in such a way that
prevents any murderer (or even a small group of them)
from denouncing or blackmailing another. The only way
to ascertain with certainty who murdered Bj is that all
the other murderers confess. Ai has a probability of 1/N
to have to kill his/her own desired victim Bi. In case
Ai must kill Bi, since the fact that Ai wants Bi dead is
presumably known by others, the best thing Ai could do
is to participate in another round with a different set of
strangers.
B. Solution to the secret sharing problem
The key is defined as A1’s sequence. The only way to
reveal it is to make the remaining N − 1 parties share
their respective sequences; the key is then composed by
the missing results. If a dishonest party D declares a re-
sult which is different to his/her actual result, then there
is a probability 1/(r − 1), where r is the number of hon-
est parties which have not yet declared their results, that
other honest party H has obtained that result. Then H
would stop the process, so Alice’s key (and thus Alice’s
action) would remain safe (dishonest parties cannot sab-
otage Alice’s action if they do not know what it is). The
order in which the agents declare their respective results
must change from round to round to avoid any dishonest
party being always the last to declare.
C. Solution to the liar detection problem
Before entering into the details of the solution, it will
be useful to sketch how it works. A(lice) must send B(ob)
[and C(arol)] some information lAB(mAB) [lAC(mAC)]
such that: (a) It is only known to Alice. (b) Its authen-
ticity can be checked by B (and C) using information
only known to him (her). (c) The information lAB(mAB)
[lAC(mAC)] is correlated with the message mAB (mAC);
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FIG. 1: Protocol for solving the liar detection problem. To
explain how it works, we will assume that nobody is lying. A
must send B a message mAB and the list lAB(mAB) of posi-
tions in A’s list lA (left) in which the message mAB appears.
Analogously, A must send C a message mAC and the corre-
sponding list lAC(mAC). Finally, B must send C a message
mBC and two lists: lBC(mBC) and lAB(mAB).
if the message were different, then this information would
also be different. Bob needs lAB(mAB) to convince Carol
that the message A sent him was actually mAB (and not
other).
Let us suppose that the message m is a trit value 0, 1,
or 2. All three parties agree to use the following protocol:
(I) If the transmitted message is mij , then the sender
i must also send j the list lij(mij) of positions in
his/her sequence in which the number mij appears
(see figure 1). Note that if the sequences are ran-
dom and long enough then any lij(mij) must con-
tain about one third of the total length L of the
sequences.
(II) The receiver j would not accept any message if the
intersection between the received list lij(mij) and
his/her list lj(mij) is not null nor if lij(mij)≪ L/3
elements.
We will assume that requirements (I) and (II) force the
dishonest party to send correct but perhaps incomplete
lists. Otherwise, if i sends a list containing n erroneous
data, then the probability that j does not accept the
message mij would be (2
n − 1)/2n. In addition,
(III) B must send C the list lBC(mAB) containing the
sequence he has (supposedly) received from A (see
figure 1).
Therefore, when C finds that mAC 6= mBC , she has
received three lists to help her to find out whether it
is A or B who is being dishonest (see figure 1). Ac-
cording to rules (I) to (III), if B wants to be dishonest
lBC(mBC) ∪ lBC(mAB) must necessarily be a subset of
lB(mBC), because B does not know lA(mBC). However,
the length of lB(mBC) is about L/3, while C is expecting
B to send her two lists with a total length of 2L/3; then
C would conclude that B was being dishonest. Alterna-
tively, if it is A who is being dishonest, the length of the
two lists that C received from B would total about 2L/3;
C would then conclude that A was being dishonest.
D. N-particle N-level supersinglets
A possible quantum method to generate sequences of
numbers with properties (i) to (iv) among N distant par-
ties is by distributing among all N parties an N -particle
N -level supersinglet |S(N)N 〉 described in (6). Once the
particles have been distributed among the parties, a di-
rection of measurement is randomly chosen and publicly
announced. Due to the N -lateral rotational invariance
of the |S(N)N 〉 states, whenever the N parties measure
the spin of the N separated particles along this direc-
tion, each of them finds a different result in the set
{0, . . . , N −1}; thus such results satisfy requirements (ii)
and (iii).
In order to accomplish requirements (i), (iv), and (v),
an essential property is nonseparability, that is, the quan-
tum predictions for the |S(N)N 〉 states cannot be repro-
duced by any local hidden variables model in which the
results of the spin measurements are somehow deter-
mined before the measurement. To show the nonsepa-
rability of |S(N)N 〉 we have to study whether they violate
Bell’s inequalities derived from the assumptions of local
realism. Most Bell’s inequalities require two alternative
local dichotomic (taking values −1 or 1) observables Aj
and Bj on each particle j. To test nonseparability, we will
use the dichotomic local observables proposed by Peres
in [9]. A Peres’ observable Ak can be operationally de-
fined as follows: to measure Ak, first measure the spin
component of particle k along direction A, S
(k)
A . If parti-
cle k is a spin-s particle, then measuring S
(k)
A could give
2s+ 1 different results. Then assign value 1 to results s,
s− 2, etc., and value −1 to results s− 1, s− 3, etc. The
operator representing observable Ak can be written as
Aˆk =
s∑
m=−s
(−1)s−m|S(k)A = m〉〈S(k)A = m|, (12)
where |S(k)A = m〉 is the eigenstate of the spin component
along direction A of particle k.
To show the nonseparability of the |S(N)N 〉 states, let
us consider the following scenario: N distant observers
share N N -level particles in the |S(N)N 〉 state; the N −m
observers can choose between measuring Aj = A and
Bj = a; the remaining m observers can choose between
measuring Ak = B and Bk = b. Then nonseparability
can be tested by means of the following Bell’s inequal-
ity, which generalizes to N particles the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt inequality [32]
|EN (A, . . . , A,B, . . . , B) + EN (A, . . . , A, b, . . . , b)
6+EN (a, . . . , a, B, . . . , B)− EN (a, . . . , a, b, . . . , b)| ≤ 2.(13)
Note that this inequality uses only a subset of all possi-
ble correlation functions (for instance, it does not use
EN (A, a, . . . , a, B, . . . , B)). For the |S(N)N 〉 states, re-
stricting our attention to Peres’ observables, the correla-
tion function E
(m)
N (A, . . . , A,B, . . . , B), which represents
the expected value of this product of the results of mea-
suring, for instance, N−m observables A, and m observ-
ables B is given by
E
(N−1)
N = (−1)f(N/2)
1
N
sin(NθAB)
sin θAB
, (14)
E
(N−2)
N = (−1)f(N/2)
1
N + 2
{
1 +
sin[(N + 1)θAB]
sin θAB
}
,(15)
where θAB is the angle between directions A and B and
f(x) gives the greatest integer less than or equal to x. In
case of m = 1, that is, using correlation functions of the
E
(N−1)
N type, we have found that |S(N)N 〉 states violate
inequality (13) for any N . The maximum violation for
N = 2 is 2
√
2, for N = 3 is 2.552, and for N →∞ tends
to 2.481. In case ofm = 2, that is, using correlation func-
tions of the E
(N−2)
N type, we have found that the |S(N)N 〉
states violate inequality (13) for any N . The maximum
violation for N = 4 is 2.418, for N = 5 is 2.424 and for
N →∞ tends to 2.481.
So far we have assumed that the N parties share a
large collection of N -level systems in the |S(N)N 〉 state.
To make sure that this is the case (and that nobody has
changed the state) requires a protocol to distribute and
test these states between the N parties such that at the
end of the protocol either all parties agree that they share
a |S(N)N 〉 state (and then they can reliably apply the de-
scribed solutions), or all of them conclude that something
went wrong (and then abort any subsequent action). For
N = 3 such a distribute-and-test protocol is explicitly
described in [16] and can be easily generalized to any
N > 3. The test requires that the parties compare a
sufficiently large subset of their particles which are sub-
sequently discarded.
V. N-QUBIT SUPERSINGLETS AND
DECOHERENCE-FREE SUBSPACES
N -qubit (with N even) supersinglets |S(2)N 〉 have found
many applications: they can be used to solve the KDP,
and the SSP, defined in section II; they can be used to
do telecloning (a process combining quantum teleporta-
tion and optimal quantum cloning from one input to M
outputs [33]). In fact, |S(2)N 〉 are the N -lateral rotation-
ally invariant version of the telecloning states introduced
in [33]. Recently, it has been found that |S(2)4 〉 can also
be used to solve the LDP described in section II [34].
Here, however, we shall be examining a different use for
these states: encoding quantum information in a way
that makes sure that it is not affected by some kind of
otherwise unavoidable errors.
In quantum computation and quantum communica-
tion [35], information is stored in the quantum state of
quantum systems, usually qubits. Preserving the desired
states of the qubits and controlling their evolution is es-
sential for most of the tasks. However, when the qubits
interact with the environment, although the overall evo-
lution of the state of the qubits-environment system is
unitary (according to quantum mechanics, the evolution
of the state of any closed system is unitary), the evolu-
tion of the state of the qubits alone (which do not form
a closed system) is not unitary. The state of the qubits
rapidly evolves into a state which is entangled with the
environment. This implies that, even if the initial state
of the qubits was pure (ρ2 = ρ), after such an interaction
the state of the qubits rapidly becomes mixed (ρ2 6= ρ).
This process is know as decoherence [36, 37]. Decoher-
ence is thus a major obstacle in quantum computation
and quantum communication.
There are two ways to overcome decoherence. One is
based on adding redundancy when encoding information
in order to detect and correct errors by using quantum
error correction codes [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. A quantum
error-correcting code is defined as a unitary mapping (en-
coding) of k qubits into a subspace of the quantum state
space of n qubits such that, if any t of the qubits undergos
arbitrary decoherence, not necessarily independently, the
resulting n qubits can be used to faithfully reconstruct
the original quantum state of the k encoded qubits.
The other approach is by encoding qubits within sub-
spaces which do not suffer decoherence due to reasons of
symmetry. These subspaces are called decoherence-free
(DF) subspaces [44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
55, 56]. Indeed, DF subspaces can be considered as a
special class of quantum error correction codes [53].
Let us illustrate the use of the |S(2)N 〉 states for con-
structing DF subspaces by considering a simple example:
N qubits coupled by a single thermal bath described by
a collection of noninteracting linear oscillators. Let us
assume that all qubits suffer the same interaction with
the bath. Such an assumption is justified as long as the
qubits have very close positions with respect to the bath
coherence length. Then, it has been shown that, for N
even, the |S(2)N 〉 states are eigenstates of the whole Hamil-
tonian of the qubits-bath system and also eigenstates of
the interaction Hamiltonian with eigenvalue zero (see [46]
for details). This is due to the fact that the |S(2)N 〉 states
are N -lateral unitary invariant. This means that, if we
act on any of them with the tensor product of N equal
unitary operators, the result will be to reproduce the
same state:
U
⊗
N
∣∣∣S(2)N
〉
=
∣∣∣S(2)N
〉
, (16)
U
⊗
N being U ⊗ . . .⊗U , where U is an unitary operator
[57].
7In addition, any (coherent or incoherent) superposi-
tion of N -lateral unitary invariant states is also N -lateral
unitary invariant. Therefore, for arbitrary N (even), the
|S(2)j 〉 states with j ranging from 2 toN (and tensor prod-
ucts thereof) span a d(N)-dimensional DF subspace. Let
us call this subspace Cd(N). The dimension of Cd(N) is
given [46] by
d(N) =
N !
(N/2)!(N/2 + 1)!
. (17)
The number of qubits encoded in Cd(N) is log2 d(N). For
large N ,
log2 d(N) ≃ N −
3
2
log2N. (18)
Therefore, the encoding efficiency, defined as
E(N) ≡ log2 d(N)
N
, (19)
is asymptotically unity.
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